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In this paper I outline the main features of the phenomenological approach, focusing on the central 
themes of intentionality, embodiment, empathy, intersubjectivity, sociality and the life-world. I argue 
that phenomenology is primarily a philosophy of intentional explication that identifies the a priori, 
structural correlations between subjectivity and all forms of constituted objectivities apprehended 
in their horizonal contexts. Intentional description reveals the structurally necessary, meaning-
informing interactions between embodied subjectivity (already caught in the nexus of intersubjectivity) 
in the context of embeddedness in the temporal, historical, and cultural life-world. I shall defend 
phenomenology as a holistic approach that rightfully defends the role of subjectivity in the constitution 
of objectivity and recognizes the inherent limitations of all forms of naturalism, objectivism and 
scientism.
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WHAT IS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH?
Phenomenology is arguably the most influential and most widespread (in terms of 
geographical reach, especially in the non-anglophone world) philosophical movement of the 
twentieth century; and, as a method or approach, it continues to be extremely influential in 
the twenty-first century, especially in philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, in the 
medical humanities (especially philosophy of psychiatry), and in intercultural philosophy, 
and any discussions involving intentionality, consciousness, embodiment, affectivity, mood, 
empathy, social relations, and embeddedness in cultural tradition. Phenomenology is a flexible 
approach and there is not one universally accepted method, nevertheless it has distinctive 
features which I shall try to outline in this paper. 
Phenomenology first emerged as the term for a scientific discipline, initially in the writings 
of Lambert, Kant and Hegel (Moran, 2000), but then was established as a specific method of 
doing philosophy by Franz Brentano in his Descriptive Psychology lectures (Brentano, 1995a) 
and by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations (Husserl, 2001). In Germany, in the nineteen 
twenties, phenomenology interacted vigorously with contemporary competing philosophical 
movements, including the Vienna Circle, German Neo-Kantianism, Life-philosophy (Simmel), 
Hermeneutics (Dilthey), with the nascent Critical Theory of the first Frankfurt School 
(Horkheimer, Adorno), and also with Marxism (Arendt, Marcuse, Tran Duc Thao). Later 
phenomenology was brought into dialogue with Neo-Hegelianism (Kojève, Hyppolite, Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty), structuralism and poststructuralism (Foucault, Derrida), and with philosophy 
of language (Reinach pioneered speech acts, Mulligan, 1987), e.g. the work of J. L. Austin and 
John Searle (Searle, 1983). 
Phenomenology explores its main themes – intentionality, intuition, eidetic insight 
(Wesensschau), perception, embodiment, empathy, intersubjectivity, sociality, historicity, 
and the life-world – in an original and, judging by the amount of attention given to 
classical phenomenology by contemporary analytic philosophers, still relevant manner 
(Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). These themes have largely been recovered and revisited in 
contemporary philosophy of mind (Dahlstrom 2015), philosophy of action, philosophy of the 
cognitive sciences, among other areas (Dennett, 1987; Noë, 2005; Hopp, 2011). Furthermore, 
phenomenology is currently valued not just for its original and still relevant discussions of 
the first-person perspective, embodiment, emotions and moods, intersubjectivity, historicity, 
etc., but also for its trenchant critique of various one-sided standpoints that have dominated 
much contemporary philosophy, e.g., naturalism (Zahavi 2004, 2010, 2013; Moran 2008, 
2013a), objectivism, and scientism (Georgi, 2009). The phenomenological tradition is currently 
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in the process of being re-invigorated through its engagement with the complex issues of 
intercultural hermeneutics (Waldenfels, 2007; Lau, 2016). 
Both as a strict method – Husserl’s “philosophy as rigorous science” (Philosophie als strenge 
Wissenschaft, Husserl, 2002) and, more generally, as a theoretical approach, phenomenology 
is now well established not only within theoretical philosophy but also in various forms of 
applied philosophy and in disciplines, such as sociology (Alfred Schütz, Harold Garfinkel), 
psychology (Aron Gurwitsch), neurology (Francisco Varela, see Petitot & Varela 1999), 
psychiatry and psychotherapy (Karl Jaspers, Ludwig Binswanger, Erwin Straus (1966), Amadeo 
Giorgi (1997), Eugene T. Gendlin, Thomas Fuchs, Louis A. Sass, see Durt et al., 2017), and, more 
recently, as a method of qualitative analysis in the social and health sciences (Jonathan A. 
Smith et al., 2009) and in the medical humanities.
Phenomenology, first and foremost, as it evolved throughout the twentieth century and into 
the twenty-first, is best understood as a tradition and an outlook or approach rather than as 
a strict method. Despite Husserl’s best efforts to stipulate its methodological rigor (Husserl, 
2014), each classical phenomenologist (e.g. Scheler, Heidegger, Stein, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty) 
has developed his or her own distinctive approach. As an established philosophical tradition, 
phenomenology has bequeathed a rich corpus of texts that are now philosophical classics, e.g. 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Husserl, 2001) Heidegger’s Being and Time (Heidegger, 2012), 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (Sartre, 1979), Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012), to name but a few, that are currently being rediscovered, especially 
in the Anglo-American tradition (Szanto, 2012), by philosophers, such as: Hubert L. Dreyfus 
(1991), Charles Taylor, Sean Dorrance Kelly (2000), Alva Noë, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson 
(2007), John McDowell, Robert Brandom, among many others. 
Phenomenology is also – and this distinguishes it from contemporary philosophy of mind-- 
consciously reflective about what traditionality, or ‘life in tradition’, involves. Hence Husserl, 
Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Waldenfels, and others, have played close attention to how 
subjective and cultural life are interwoven in a layered and sedimented manner, how 
traditions are handed on, distorted, emptied out of significance and reborn in the ebb and flow 
of collective social and historical intentionality. It is not just that all humans live in history, 
and tell their historical narratives, their orientation to existence is such as to be intrinsically 
historical. Some phenomenologists have been drawn toward Hegel’s or Dilthey’s discussions of 
historical evolution and development, but phenomenology tends to look more at how humans 
live temporally in an historical tradition. As Heidegger puts it in Being and Time, Being historical 
or ‘historicality’ or ‘historicity’ (Geschichtlichkeit) is an a priori condition of being human 
(Heidegger, 1962). Or, as Merleau-Ponty famously put it, human being is “an historical idea, 
not a natural species” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). Human existence then has to be understood in 
terms of its overall temporal and historical dimensions. At the same time, Husserl’s reduction 
is an attempt to break with the natural flow of this historicity (Husserl, 1970, p. 151).There 
is, so to speak, even such a thing as the ‘historical way’ to the reduction, that Husserl speaks 
about in 1937 and which he regarded as more primary than the way outlined in Ideas I (Moran, 
2013b). Furthermore, as Husserl explored, all cultures live within horizons of familiarity and 
strangeness. Every life-world has dimensions of “home-world” and “alien-world” (Steinbock, 
1995); everyone lives within horizons which lay out structures of normality and abnormality, 
harmony and surprise, yet these structural dimensions of experience rarely are foregrounded 
in intentional explication.
2. Phenomenology 




WHAT IS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH?
Phenomenology essentially is intentional description, i.e. it aims to describe every kind 
of object or ‘objectual’ situation or state of affairs, in terms of its correlation with an 
apprehending subjectivity. In this sense, phenomenology is a philosophy of correlation. Full 
explanation requires taking the subjective point-of-view into consideration. In his Crisis of 
European Sciences Husserl claimed his real philosophical breakthrough came in 1898 when he 
realized that there was a “universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and 
manners of givenness” (Husserl, 1970, p. 166 n.). Every object must be understood not solely as 
it is ‘in itself’ but in necessary relation to the subjective acts that disclose it. Anything that is – 
whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs – is “an index of a subjective system of 
correlations”, Husserl, 1970, p. 165). Husserl writes:
The correlation between world (the world of which we always speak) and its subjective 
manners of givenness never evoked philosophical wonder (that is, prior to the first 
breakthrough of “transcendental phenomenology” in the Logical Investigations), in spite 
of the fact that it had made itself felt even in pre-Socratic philosophy and among the 
Sophists – though here only as a motive for skeptical argumentation. This correlation 
never aroused a philosophical interest of its own which could have made it the object of 
an appropriate scientific attitude. (Husserl, 1970, p. 165)
According to this a priori correlation, the manner in which entities in the world present 
themselves is always related to the subjective way of apprehending these entities. As Husserl 
puts it in his 1917 Inaugural Address to Freiburg University entitled “Pure Phenomenology: Its 
Method and Field of Investigation”:
To every object there correspond an ideally closed system of truths that are true of 
it and, on the other hand, an ideal system of possible cognitive processes by virtue 
of which the object and the truths about it would be given to any cognitive subject. 
(Moran & Mooney, 2002, p. 125)
Phenomenology then is a form of correlationism, although this is not to condemn it, as 
Quentin Meillassoux attempts to do in his recent attack on correlationism (Meillassoux, 2009). 
Correlationism aims to give a fuller account of ontology by including the subjective dimension, 
hence phenomenological ontology. 
Phenomenology, broadly speaking, involves the careful, unprejudiced description of conscious, 
lived experiences (Husserl’s Erlebnisse), precisely according to the manner that they are 
experienced, without the imposition of external explanatory frameworks, whether these 
be drawn from the natural or social sciences, from religion, or even from common sense or 
ordinary language use. In Being and Time, Heidegger defines phenomenology as “to let that 
which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 58). This formulation is close to that found in Husserl’s Crisis of European 
Sciences: “to take the conscious life, completely without prejudice, just as what it quite 
immediately gives itself, as itself, to be” (Husserl, 1970, p. 233). In this sense, phenomenology 
seeks to remain descriptively true to what conscious experience – understood in the widest 
possible sense – reveals itself to be to the disciplined observer. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
practice of phenomenological seeing is meant to disrupt the everyday. It aims at “disclosure 
of the world” (révélation du monde). In his Phenomenology of Perception (1945), he writes: “true 
philosophy entails learning to see the world anew” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. lxxxv). 
The key to the methodology is the manner of this observation – which is not introspection (as 









and essential features structuring the flow of experience. Husserl often made somewhat 
grandiose claims about phenomenology as the “science of sciences”, and an ultimate 
presuppositionless science, and these claims can easily be challenged, but his overall vision of 
a foundational science that explored the entire life of consciousness uncovering its essential 
structures has an enduring appeal. This Husserl writes in his Lectures on Passive Synthesis:
But if one has learned to see phenomenologically and has learned to grasp the essence 
of intentional analysis, if one has—expressed in the form of the Goethian myth—found 
the way to the mother of knowledge, to its realm of pure consciousness in which all 
being arises constitutively and from which all knowledge as knowledge of beings has to 
fashion its ultimate comprehensible clarification, then one will initially make the quite 
astounding discovery that those types of lived experience are not a matter of arbitrary 
special features of an accidental life of consciousness, but rather that terms like 
“perception,” “memory,” “expectation,” etc., express universal, essential structures, 
that is, strictly necessary structures of every conceivable stream of consciousness, thus, 
so to speak, formal structures of a life of consciousness as such whose profound study 
and exact conceptual circumscription, whose systematic graduated levels of foundation 
and genetic development is the first great task of a transcendental phenomenology. It 
is precisely nothing less that the science of the essential shapes [Wesensgestaltungen] of 
consciousness as such, as the science of maternal origins. (Husserl, 2001a, pp. 365-6).
This is Husserlian phenomenology in a nutshell: “the science of the essential shapes 
[Wesensgestaltungen] of consciousness as such”. 
Husserl is uncovering the formal structures of any consciousness whatsoever and thereby 
the various manners of givenness (Gegebenheit – what Heidegger called “the magic word” of 
phenomenology) through which the world is manifest to consciousness. Husserl is here self-
consciously radicalizing Kant’s project of a critique of pure reason. For Husserl, if one can 
uncover the essential a priori structures of subjectivity (in its fullest sense – the whole of mental 
life or ‘life of spirit’ (Geistesleben), as he terms it), the source of all knowledge about the world, 
actual, possible, impossible, and so on, will be revealed. Husserl sought to uncover the essential 
nature of subjectivity itself, from its deepest layer of originary time-consciousness, up through 
the layers of embodied sensuous, perceptual and emotional life, to the very core of the self in its 
relations with other selves and to the horizoning, shared world. Husserl’s structural account of 
inner awareness of temporality (Husserl, 1990) is still a vital source for philosophical reflection.
Phenomenology has advocated both the ideal of a completely presuppositionless starting point 
for philosophical reflection and also the idea that all experiences are interpreted in terms 
of one’s linguistic, cultural and intentional horizons. Husserlian phenomenology, ab initio, 
claimed to be “presuppositionless” (voraussetzunglos: Husserl, 2001, vol. 1, p. 177). Thus he 
writes even in his Amsterdam Lectures of 1928:
We will refrain from any traditional prejudgments, even the most universally obvious 
ones of traditional logic, which already have perhaps taken from Nature unnoticed 
elements of meaning. We will hold ourselves resolutely to what phenomenological 
reflection presents to us as consciousness and object of consciousness, and purely 
to what comes to actual, evident self-givenness. In other words, we will interrogate 
exclusively the phenomenological experience, clearly and quite concretely thinking 
into a reflective experience of consciousness, without interest in determining 
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Husserl remained committed to presuppositionless as a methodological principle. On the other 
hand, Heidegger’s development of hermeneutical philosophy, brought interpretation and 
‘pre-judgment’ (Vorurteil) to the heart of the phenomenological discussion of understanding 
(Verstehen). Indeed, Husserl, too, in his late work, although he retained the goal of final 
‘clarification’ (Klärung) did recognise the embeddedness of human being within their cultures 
and the manner in which their horizons were determined by their cultural embeddedness. 
As an example of how themes can return in different form (and without recognition 
of its Vorwelt), consider the phenomenon that, after several centuries of discussion of 
presupposition, prejudgement (Vorurteil), hermeneutics, conflict of interpretation, and 
so on, ‘implicit bias’ has now emerged in empirical psychology and has been, somewhat 
uncritically, embraced by contemporary analytic philosophy, without reference to the 
longer tradition. One wonders how Hans-Georg Gadamer’s assertion that all understanding 
is misunderstanding, and Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion (Gadamer 1984) might sit 
with those enthusiastically detecting and claiming to neutralise if not eliminate implicit bias. 
Phenomenology begins from the recognition of intentionality: our subjective comportment 
and conscious behavior is essentially both meaning-apprehending and meaning-making, 
overall making sense of the world. Husserl speaks of Sinngebung, ‘sense-giving’, ‘sense-
bestowal’; ‘sense-explication’ (Sinnauslegung), captured in ‘reflexion’ (Besinnung). Furthermore, 
phenomenology maintains that intentionality is all pervasive: all aspects of live involve a 
coming together of subjective attitude and objective meaning. Husserl calls intentionality 
(Intentionalität) – elsewhere described as ‘directedness’ (Gerichtetsein) or ‘aboutness’ (Meinung) 
– the “principal theme” (Hauptthema) of phenomenology (Husserl, 2014, p. 161). Intentionality 
was reinserted into modern philosophy (recovered by the Scholastics) by Franz Brentano in 
his 1874 Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint (Brentano, 1995). In his effort to define the 
domain of psychological science, Brentano proposed that intentionality was the defining 
characteristic of all and only mental phenomena (Moran, 1996). Initially, Brentano conceived 
of intentionality rather narrowly as a relation between a mental act and its ‘internal’ object 
(dreaming about winning the race is an act of dreaming that is directed at a peculiar object 
winning the race, in this case a complex state-of affairs). Husserl expanded this insight to 
make intentionality the meaning-endowing character of all lived experiences. Furthermore, 
Husserl treated intentionality not narrowly as a relation between a mental act and its object, 
and especially not as a kind of representation of the outer world in the inner mind (Drummond 
2012; 1992; 1990), but as expressing the fundamental ways embodied subjects, interacting 
with other subjects, apprehend the world as senseful and respond actively generating further 
commitments of sense. Intentionality is essentially a claim about the sensefulness of experience 
based on the irreducible, essential interrelatedness between signifying consciousness and 
the surrounding world of significance. This interpretative activity need not be explicitly 
linguistic. In this regard, Husserl distinguishes between ‘sense’ (Sinn) (e.g. of non-linguistic 
perceptions) and ‘meaning’ (Bedeutung) that is expressed in language. Our embodied sensings, 
perceptions, feelings, moods, emotions, imaginings, thoughts, already have ‘sense’ prior to 
verbal articulation and may in fact be consciously experienced in an embodied manner. Our 
perceptual vista simply unfolds for us as we turn our eyes around to view the landscape; 
our hearing immediately experiences being in the midst of a noisy scene with car engines, 
slamming doors, human voices, barking dogs, or whatever. Even ‘white noise’ has a certain 
experiential significance – and is experienced as uncomfortable, distressing, and so on. All 
experiencing is experiencing of something and as something. We feel the day to be gloomy and 
we lack energy and enthusiasm. These are all forms of sense-disclosure.
Furthermore, experiences occur against a backdrop of previously meaningful experiences, 
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in what Husserl calls the ‘harmoniousness’ (Einstimmigkeit) of our experience, which in turn 
motivates certain expectations of continuity, how the future situation will pan out, and so on. 
We have the sense of the world unfolding, going on, outside us and within us. Aron Gurwitsch 
especially developed Husserl’s account of the theme and its ‘thematic field’:
What is given in genuine sense experience presents itself as a member of a system, 
becoming what it phenomenally is by its relatedness to the system, by the role which it 
plays in it, by its significance for it. (Gurwitsch, 1966, p. 348)
Husserl’s and Gurwitsch’s accounts of perception had a major impact on Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945; Merleau-Ponty, 2012), which is still extraordinarily 
influential in contemporary philosophy of mind.
Intentionality is widely discussed in analytic philosophy (Dennett, 1987; Searle, 1983) also, 
but phenomenology generally opposes immanent, representationalist, causal, and naturalist 
accounts of intentionality (Dreyfus 2000, 2007), and instead approach conscious acts and 
states as conferring ‘sense’ (Sinn), ‘meaning’, or ‘significance’ (Bedeutung, Meinung), in part 
constituted through embodied ‘comportment’ (Verhalten) and intersubjective ‘interaction’ 
(Ineinandersein), inhabiting a pre-given world already charged with significance (Dreyfus 
1991; 2007a). Human beings cast a web of sense over their experiences, so even disturbed, 
pathological subjects imbue their fantasies and paranoid thoughts with senseful plausibility 
(Gendlin 1962). Indeed, for Husserl, so long as subjectivity exists, the idea of complete disorder, 
chaos, and senselessness (Unsinn), pure discordance, is literally unthinkable since, at the very 
least, the subjective flow of egoic consciousness will continue (Husserl 2014).
Husserl has a tiered or nested account of how intentional states are founded and interrelated. 
Perception is the primal or ‘originary’ form of intuiting, whereas memory and imagination 
are reproductive modifications of perception. Memory is a form of ‘calling to mind’ or ‘re-
presenting’ (Vergegenwärtigung) that no longer has the distinctive bodily presence that 
characterizes perception. Imagining is yet another form of presenting which posits an object 
somewhat detached from perceptual surroundings. Furthermore, genuine representing 
or mental envisaging is, for phenomenology, just one peculiar intentional mode. Pictorial 
representing has its own structural character that is founded on the more direct perceptual 
intentionality. Empty or ‘signitive’ intendings, for Husserl, constitute the largest class of 
our conscious acts, and have a particular relevance in mathematics and scientific discourse 
where signs are manipulated in an empty way but ultimately, for Husserl must be grounded in 
fulfilled intuitions. 
For Husserl, not just the modes of the intentional stance but, correlatively, the objects of 
intention are multiple. For instance, one can perceive objects and their properties, but also 
one can perceive actions, processes, relations, and complexes or events that Husserl calls 
“states of affairs” (Sachverhalte, Husserl 2001, vol. 2, 155). Perceptions found perceptual 
statements. Perceptual statements and judgments are, in turn, complex multi-layered acts –
linguistic utterances select aspects of the overall perceived state of affairs (I can say that I see 
the blackbird, the blackbird flying, that the bird is startled, etc.) but never reproduce the intuitive 
fullness of the actual sensuous perception itself. In this regard, as Merleau-Ponty insists, 
perception is richer than thought; and conceptual judgements at best one-sidedly articulate 
what is implicit in our incredibly rich perceptions. 
Furthermore, Husserl recognized that all objects that occupy space are apprehended in 
‘profiles’ or ‘adumbrations’ (Abschattungen), and their essence is never exhausted by these 
profiles. An object is always further determinable and portends ever new contexts in which 
these prefigured experiences can be fulfilled. Physical objects present with an ‘excess’ 
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(Überschuss), whereby their determinate features are supplemented with a horizon of 
indeterminacy of features that can be explored in further perceptions (Hopp, 2011). In Ideas 
I (Husserl 2014), Husserl speaks of “modes of indeterminate suggestion and non-intuitive co-
presence” (Husserl 2014, 183) that are wrapped up in the experience. Husserl writes:
No matter how completely we may perceive a thing, it is never given in perception 
with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides 
at once. … Every aspect, every continuity of single adumbrations, regardless how far 
this continuity may extend, offers us only sides. And to our mind this is not just a 
mere statement of fact: It is inconceivable that external perception would exhaust the 
sensible-material content of its perceived object; it is inconceivable that a perceptual 
object could be given in the entirety of its sensibly intuited features, literally, from all 
sides at once in a self-contained perception. (Husserl, 2001a, pp. 39–40)
Perception, for Husserl, anchors us to the world. Perception is the primal or ‘originary’ form 
of intuiting, accompanied by the firm conviction of things (Husserl’s Urglaube) being present 
thus and so. Perceptual objects are given to apprehension with full ‘bodily presence’ (Husserl: 
leibhaftig; Merleau-Ponty: en chair et os). Husserl writes:
[Perception] is what originally makes us conscious of the realities existing for us and 
“the” world as actually existing. To cancel out all such perception, actual and possible, 
means, for our total life of consciousness, to cancel out the world as objective sense and 
as reality accepted by us; it means to remove from all thought about the world (in every 
signification of this word) the original basis of sense and legitimacy. (Husserl, 1974, p. 26)
The perceived object is directly presented as a whole, even if it is really presented as 
possessing an indefinite number of further profiles that can be brought into view. 
Perception is also truth-giving, truth-grasping. It has a ‘filled’ character that provides the 
intuitive basis for our sense of truth. Husserl conceives of the structure of intentionality as 
essentially a dynamic movement of empty intentions towards fulfillment. Actual perception 
is the paradigm case of fulfilled intuition (albeit that the object always presents in profiles or 
shadings, Abschattungen). There are different degrees of fulfillment. Husserl also connects 
intentionality with the manner that objectivities have ‘self-givenness’ (Selbstgegebenheit) in 
experience, a phenomenon he often calls ‘self-evidence’ (Evidenz), and which he strongly 
distinguished from psychological feelings of certainty. Husserl sees intentionality and 
evidence as essentially correlated:
The concept of any intentionality whatever - any life-process of consciousness-of 
something or other - and the concept of evidence, the intentionality that is the giving 
of something-itself [Selbstgebung] are essentially correlative. (Husserl, 1969, p. 160)
Perfect evidence, for Husserl, involves the grasping of the object in full givenness and with 
the clarity and distinctness appropriate to it. For Husserl, intentionality is related to the self-
givenness of experiences and self-givenness has the remarkable character of manifestness or 
what Husserl calls ‘phenomenality’. Thus he writes:
… one can say of every mental process that in it something is appearing to the 
particular I insofar as the I is somehow conscious of it. Accordingly, phenomenality 
[die Phänomenalität], as a characteristic that specifically belongs to appearing and to the 
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thing that appears, would, if understood in this broadened sense of the term, be the 
fundamental characteristic of the mental. (Husserl, 1997)
For Husserl, a physical object, apprehended phenomenologically, supports a potentially 
indefinite number of possible modes of access to it. Hence Husserl speaks of the intended 
object as “an idea in the Kantian sense” (Husserl, 2014, p. 284). Intentional objects already 
contain the possible modes of approach to them as a series of lawfully related noemata 
(Drummond & Embree, 1992). The aspectual shapes or modes of approach to the object can 
be visualized as ‘windows’ or avenues of approach to the object, set up in an essentially pre-
determined way. Thus, in the Amsterdam Lectures, Husserl describes the noema of a house in a 
house-perception as opening onto an infinite horizon of other possible profiles of the house:
The question immediately arises as to how come it is evident that this pointing-ahead 
belongs to the phenomenon-in-consciousness? How come this horizon-consciousness 
refers us in fact to further actually unexperienced traits of the same <phenomenon>? 
Certainly, this is already an interpretation which goes beyond the moment of 
experiencing, which we have called the “horizon-consciousness,” which is, indeed, as 
is easily determined, completely non-intuitive and thus in and of itself empty. (Husserl, 
1997, pp. 226-227)
In his mature works, Husserl expands his earlier analyses of the specific features of 
intentional objects to consider the non-objectual intentionality of horizons, fringes, 
that manifest themselves in the temporal flow of a unified “nexus of consciousness” 
(Bewusstseinszusammenhang, Husserl, 1969, p. 159) and ultimately form the life-world 
(Lebenswelt) that is ‘always already there’ but can never be objectified. In Ideas I Husserl defines 
the ‘horizon’ as “‘what is co-given’ but not genuinely” (Husserl, 2014, p. 77) and, in Experience 
and Judgment, he speaks of “the horizon of typical pre-acquaintance in which every object is 
pregiven” (Husserl, 1973, p. 150). Husserl believed he has made a genuine breakthrough with 
his concept of horizonal-intentionality (Horizont-Intentionalität), originally inspired by William 
James. Husserl’s ‘horizon-intentionality’ is later taken up by Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty to 
explicate the complex manners experiences are framed by temporal and other horizons that 
have their own kind of significance. 
Intentionality covers the whole of conscious life; everything is an achievement or 
accomplishment of intentional consciousness: “… nothing exists for me otherwise than by 
virtue of the actual and potential performance of my own consciousness [Bewusstseinsleistung]” 
(Husserl, 1969, p. 234). Life is intentional, ‘accomplishing’ life with its potentially infinite horizons 
of intentional implication, uniting together into the collective experience known as spirit. As 
Husserl writes in the Crisis:
… conscious life is through and through an intentionally accomplishing life [intentional 
leistendes Leben] through which the life-world … in part attains anew and in part has 
already attained its meaning and validity. All real mundane objectivity is constituted 
accomplishment in this sense, including that of men and animals (Husserl, 1970, p. 204).
The Husserlian account of lived experiences is extraordinarily rich. For phenomenology, 
not just perceptions and judgments (the traditional focus of epistemology) but also feelings, 
emotions (Vendrell Ferran 2008, 2015), acts of willing, moods, have a peculiar manifestness of 
their own which contributes to the manner in which consciousness engages with the world. 
For Husserl, intentional experiences form a seamless unity in the flow of consciousness but 
6. The 
Intentionality 
of Emotions and 
Moods
81
WHAT IS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH?
nevertheless, there is a structural order of experiences. 
Husserl’s account of intentionality was further radicalized by Heidegger and by Merleau-
Ponty’s analyses of embodied, habitual and practical intentionality, focusing especially on pre-
theoretical, habitual, practical behavior in an environment of already-given significance. 
Phenomenologists have seen the significance of moods as being ways in which the world is 
disclosed and also the manner in which one is disclosed to oneself. Thus Stephan Strasser 
claims that moods are “the primordial phenomenological characteristic of self-experiencing 
life” (Strasser, 1997, p. 121). Heidegger, in Being and Time, made significant contributions 
with his analyses of ‘fundamental moods’ (Grundstimmungen), disposition or ‘state-of-mind’ 
(Befindlichkeit), and the experience of ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit), finding oneself always 
thrown into a situation. Heidegger (1962) discussed fundamental moods such as anxiety 
(Angst) which he distinguished from fear, a relationship to something in particular, but has 
as its object one’s whole being-in-the-world. One’s whole being is experienced as groundless 
and unsupported. Similarly Aurel Kolnai (2004) developed an analysis of disgust, and Sartre 
develops this with his account of vertigo or nausea – where one experiences one’s own 
absolute freedom. Vertigo is not so much the fear of falling as the fear of jumping. One’s inner 
freedom is limitless and, in this sense, truly terrifying, opening up before one like a chasm. 
Sartre’s phenomenological accounts of the experience of freedom have enduring value (Sartre 
1979).
Part of the enduring appeal of phenomenology is that it respects the centrality and 
ineliminability of the first-person point of view, the first and primary standpoint from which 
humans encounter the world. Phenomenology argues that the objective view --what Merleau-
Ponty calls, in his 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, “the view from nowhere” (la vue de nulle 
part, Merleau-Ponty, 2012)—is achieved only by abstracting from the original first-person 
stance with which humans engage the world.
All knowing requires the engagement of subjectivity and is the achievement of a first-person.
This is why Husserl stresses his so called ‘Cartesian’ way of practicing phenomenology, 
which Husserl articulated especially in the Cartesian Meditations, lectures given in Paris 
in 1929 (Husserl, 1960). Subsequently, in the Crisis, Husserl identified at least three ‘ways’ 
of performing the reduction: the “Cartesian way” (Husserl, 1970, p. 154), the “way from 
psychology” (Weg von der Psychologie, Husserl, 1970, p. 208), and the way from the pregiven 
life-world (Husserl, 1970, p. 136). Husserl admires Descartes’ attempt to overthrow the existing 
sciences and set forth the indubitable grounds for a first philosophy that will be “a science 
grounded on an absolute foundation” (Husserl, 1960, p. 1). Husserl also agrees with Descartes 
that the practice of philosophy must be a first-personal affair, and that the meditator must 
accept only his or her own existence as having an absolute indubitability. For Husserl, 
Descartes has uncovered the fundamental fact that all being is relative to consciousness and 
that the transcendental ego has absolute being (Husserl, 1967, p. 69). There is an undeniable 
priority to my self-experience. Phenomenology attends to whatever has immediate ‘self-
givenness’ in the realm of self-conscious intuitive experience. One can turn the focus of 
one’s attention away from matters in the world to what is given in the stream of one’s own 
first-personal conscious experiencing. One can attend to the various manners of givenness of 
whatever is encountered within that stream of experiencing. 
This requires the meditating self or ego to come to understand the essential nature of the self 
in general, and thereby modifying its own nature to include the possibility of other different 
natures (other egos). Husserl thought that this insight into the essence of egohood or selfhood 
belonged exclusively to conscious experiences of the form of the cogito and offered a unique 
starting point for gaining what he considered to be apodictic knowledge. Note, however, that 
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Husserl has no interest in what is uniquely subjective and idiosyncratic to my experiencing – 
he is interested in the essential form of self-experiencing as such. Of course, Husserl’s embrace 
of Cartesianism is now seen as just one strand in his complex layered set of approaches. 
Husserl in later years sought to embed this phenomenology of self-experience into a wider 
phenomenology of the experience of alterity.
As Husserl’s phenomenology developed, he increasingly emphasised that we are incarnate, that 
is to say, embodied, situated, finite human beings, already in the world and for whom the world 
has a given, taken-for-granted, ‘natural’ status. Husserl himself speaks of the ‘phenomenology 
of embodiment’ (Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit). Similarly, he attended to the en-worlded 
nature of our experience. Much of Husserl’s puzzlement came from trying to figure out how it 
is that the lived world comes to have this taken-for-grantedness, self-givenness and obviousness in 
the natural attitude.
Phenomenology is interested not just in the first-person, but in the second-person, in the 
alter ego, both singular and plural, and the constitution of various forms of ‘I-Thou’ relations 
(Husserl speaks of the ‘Ich-Du-Beziehung’) and ‘we-intentionality’ (Wir-Intentionalität) in 
what is now known as social or collective intentionality. Indeed, some of the most fruitful 
discussions concerning the formation of the ‘we’ and ‘we-world’ (Wir-Welt), as Husserl calls it, 
have emerged in recent social philosophy in dialogue with phenomenology (Moran & Szanto, 
2015). Phenomenology is, as Husserl put it, a science of subjectivity, but it also a science of 
subjectivity embodied and embedded and involved in the intersubjective constitution of 
objectivity and of the world. 
Phenomenologists can begin from their own experience, but they are open to understanding 
other people’s experiences, as they are experienced (examples can be found in real life, in 
literature, or, simply, through the process of imaginative variation, a procedure Husserl 
himself practiced). In other words, close attention must be paid to the subject’s own account 
of their experiences, emotions, and how they form their general sense of matters that affect 
them. Phenomenology is replete with descriptive analyses of affective life, feelings, emotions, 
moods, existential concerns, and various dimensions of lived embodiment and more generally 
‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-Sein, Heidegger, 1962; être-au-monde, Merleau-Ponty, 2012).
One of phenomenology’s greatest and most useful discoveries is that of the ‘natural attitude’ 
(die natürliche Einstellung)—a term that Husserl uses from as early as 1906-7, but which 
emerges in print in Ideas I (Husserl, 2014, p. 48). In order to focus on the manner of experiencing, 
it necessarily involves interrupting natural, straight-forward experiencing. According to 
Husserl, in our everyday practices and routines, we are in a certain attitude (he calls it ‘the 
natural attitude’) towards things and towards the world, and somehow this is a state of self-
forgetfulness. The world presents itself as simply there, given, available to us. Husserl’s insight 
(inspired in part by Avenarius’ discussion of non-dualistic experiential life in Der menschliche 
Weltbegriff) is that the ordinary, natural world that surrounds us on all sides, in which we live 
and move and have our being, is actually itself the correlate of a very powerful yet also quite 
specific and particular attitude: the natural attitude. In his 1935 Vienna Lecture Husserl defines 
an attitude as “a habitually fixed style of willing life (Stil des Willenlebens) comprising directions 
of the will or interests that are prescribed by this style, comprising the ultimate ends, the 
cultural accomplishments whose total style is thereby determined” (Husserl, 1970, p. 280). In 
his Kant Society lecture in 1974, he describes the natural attitude:
The natural attitude is the form in which the total life of humanity is realized in 





9. The Natural 
Attitude and its 
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millennium, until out of science and philosophy there developed unique motivations 
for a revolution. (Husserl, 1974, 20)
Disrupting the natural attitude and undermining its hold on us will be central to Husserl’s 
practice of the phenomenological method. It is important also to emphasize that the scientific 
worldview which is now entwined with the natural worldview does not necessarily provide us 
with a grasp of reality and truth in the fullest sense. 
In order to lay bare the intentional constitution of the natural attitude, phenomenologists 
apply the procedure of ‘suspension’, ‘bracketing’, or phenomenological reduction, to strip 
away the presuppositions embedded in the natural attitude. Husserl’s procedure of epoché 
(a term he introduced in Ideas I to stand for the set of operations that excludes the naive, 
natural, objective attitude to the world) is an explicit radicalisation and modification of 
Cartesian doubt. Husserl interpreted Descartes as attempting a universal world-negation, 
whereas he himself sought not negation but rather neutralisation of worldly commitments. 
Breaking with the ‘natural attitude’ to prepare the mind for the scientific attitude is also part 
of Descartes’ programme. Husserl says that his phenomenological epoché differs from Cartesian 
doubt (Husserl, 2014), in that he interprets the actual, historical Cartesian doubt as a kind 
of dogmatic scepticism, involving the dogmatic denial of the existence of the world, rather 
than as the more Pyrrhonian scepticism, which keeps existential judgements in suspense and 
remains uncommitted. Husserl wants to uncover the “genuine sense of the necessary regress 
to the ego” (Husserl, 1960, p. 6). His method is a treating of assumptions as mere “acceptance-
phenomena”, “inhibiting”, “putting out of play” (Husserl, 1960, p. 20). In Ideas I, for instance, 
Husserl speaks of epoché as rigorous ‘exclusion’ (Ausschaltung) and an ‘abstention’ (Enthaltung) 
from the methods and propositions of the philosophical tradition (Husserl, 2014, p. 52). The 
epoché and the associated ‘phenomenological reductions’ are meant to allow the nature of 
the experiences to become manifest without distortion and to lead back (Latin: re-ducere) to 
the apprehension of the essential (‘eidetic’) structures, contents, and objects and how they 
interconnect with other forms of consciousness.
Husserl borrowed the epoché from the Greek sceptics – and it is noteworthy in the quotation 
above from the Crisis that Husserl speaks of the correlation between world and subjectivity 
as already arising under the mode of skepticism about knowledge already in the ancient 
Greeks. Indeed, Husserl thinks ancient Greek philosophers – a “few Greek eccentrics” (ein 
Paar griechischen Sonderlingen, Husserl, 1970, p. 289), as he puts it in the Vienna Lecture– were 
responsible for an entirely new attitude that broke with the prevailing mytho-poeic way of 
seeing the cosmos and led to the ‘break into’ (Einbruch) of the theoretical attitude which is the 
source of Western science (the only truly unbounded or infinite science). Heidegger, however, 
does not make explicit use of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, whereas Husserl thought 
it as essential to the point of claiming that anyone who misunderstood the importance of the 
reduction could not be doing phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty accepted a modified version of 
the phenomenological reduction. He famously said that the lesson of Husserl’s reduction was 
that it could not be carried out to completion because it ran up against the indissoluble life-
world – this “rupture can teach us nothing but the unmovitated springing forth of the world” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. lxxvii).
Husserl’s ‘bracketing’ is a complex procedure, demanding perpetual vigilance. In one sense, 
what it brings to light is the extraordinary web of assumptions and practical beliefs that 
make up what he calls ‘the natural attitude’. It has not been universally adopted within 
phenomenology, nevertheless, something like this bracketing and suspension is necessary to 






Husserl is notorious for his conception that all “sense and being” (Sinn und Sein, Hua I 117; 
Seinssinn, I 118) is constituted by the transcendental ego. Nevertheless, the philosophical 
idea of the ‘transcendental ego’ can be rehabilitated and given a reasonably plausible 
reconstruction. For Husserl, the ego is a dynamic entity, a self that grows and develops, 
sediments properties that become convictions, and has a history. When a decision is made, 
this is not just a passing episode but becomes a permanent possession (even if it is later 
renounced). Husserl characterises the ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental’ ego as an “Ego-pole” (Ichpol, 
Husserl, 1960, p. 68) or centre of experiences, including all actions and affections, as the 
“substrate of habitualities” (Husserl, 1960, p. 69). The ego is not an empty ‘pole’ that sends 
and receives conscious ‘rays’, it is a concrete living self, an individual, an “abiding personal 
ego” (als stehendes und bleibendes personales Ich, Husserl, 1960, pp. 66-67), a monad. It collects 
its experiences together into an enduring unity through the performance of various complex 
syntheses and becomes a self, with convictions, values, an outlook, a history: “The ego 
constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a history” (Husserl, 1960, p. 75). The 
transcendental ego, moreover, necessarily functions within the open field of all possible egos – 
transcendental intersubjectivity (akin to the open field of language which is an intersubjective 
network that is activated in each speaker). Husserl writes:
But each soul also stands in community [Vergemeinschaftung] with others which are 
intentionally interrelated, that is, in a purely intentional, internally and essentially 
closed nexus [Zusammenhang], that of intersubjectivity. (Husserl, 1970, p. 238)
Merleau-Ponty correctly emphasized this point – transcendental subjectivity is already 
an intersubjectivity, but that is not to say that this statement resolves the extremely 
difficult problems concerning the constitution of the transcendental ego. Indeed, many 
phenomenologists, beginning with Heidegger, abandoned the essentially Kantian language 
of transcendental subjectivity in favor of discussion of the conditions of the possibility of 
historical human existence. However, I believe much can still be learned from the mature 
Husserl’s meditations on transcendental subjectivity especially in relation to the constitution 
of its environing world.
Classical phenomenology has many detailed analyses of the structures of conscious life and 
of the ‘life-world’ – the ordinary, everyday, pre-scientific world that we all inhabit and which 
provides a unified backdrop for all our intentional activities across history. The mature 
Husserl thus enlarged the scope of phenomenology by suggesting new approaches that 
moved beyond the exploration of subjectivity, specifically, in the Crisis, “by inquiring back 
from the life-world”, which is, of course, also the accepted, social and communal world that is, 
in Heidegger’s words, “always already there” (immer schon da). It is precisely the experience 
of intersubjectivity and the concept of a horizonal world as backdrop to all experience 
that requires a new kind of phenomenology of collective cultural experience. Heidegger’s 
distinction between inauthentic and authentic selfhood, and especially his discussion of ‘the 
one’, das Man, anyone, also contributes to the understanding of a kind of participatory stance 
that is anonymous and not personally defined in which we stand in the world. The life-world is 
an extra-ordinary and enduring innovation. Hans-Georg Gadamer has written:
In Husserl’s later work the magic word Lebenswelt (lifeworld) appears—one of those 
rare and wonderful artificial words (it does not appear before Husserl) that have found 
their way into the general linguistic consciousness, thus attesting to the fact that 
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has reminded us of all the presuppositions that underlie all scientific knowledge. 
(Gadamer, 1998, p. 55)
Many twentieth-century European philosophers—including Jan Patočka (2016), Jürgen 
Habermas (1987), and Hans Blumenberg (1986) – have taken over Husserl’s conception of 
the life-world. The life-world is a world of cumulative tradition acquired through what 
Husserl calls sedimentation (Sedimentierung, Husserl, 1970, p. 362), according to which 
certain earlier experiences become passively enfolded in our on-going experience, just 
as language retains earlier meanings in its etymologies. As Husserl says in the “Origin of 
Geometry”, “cultural structures, appear on the scene in the form of tradition; they claim, 
so to speak, to be ‘sedimentations’ (Sedimentierungen) of a truth-meaning that can be made 
originally self-evident” (Husserl, 1970, p. 367). Indeed, Husserl speaks of ‘sedimentation’ as 
“traditionalization” (Husserl, 1970, p. 52). There never has been such an investigation of 
the ‘life-world’ as “subsoil” (Untergrund) for all forms of theoretical truth (Husserl, 1970, p. 
124). This science of the life-world would be descriptive of the life-world in its own terms, 
bracketing conceptions intruding from the natural and cultural sciences. In this sense, Husserl 
speaks of an “ontology of the life-world” (Ontologie der Lebenswelt, see Crisis § 51). In the Kant 
Society lecture Husserl speaks of the results of the phenomenological method as follows:
The world took on an infinite wideness as soon as the actual life-world, the world in 
the “how” of the givenness of mental process [die wirkliche Lebenswelt, die Welt im Wie der 
Erlebnisgegebenheit], was observed. It took on the whole range of the manifold subjective 
appearances, modes of consciousness, modes of possible position-taking; for it was, for 
the subject, never given otherwise than in this subjective milieu, and in purely intuitive 
description of the subjectively given there was no in-itself that is not given in subjective 
modes of the for-me or for-us, and the in-itself itself appears as a characteristic in this 
context and has to undergo therein its clarification of sense. (Husserl, 1974, p. 11). 
Husserl contrasts the practically experienced life-world with the world as given in objective 
science. He writes in Ideas II:
In ordinary life [im gewöhnlichen Leben] we have nothing whatever to do with nature-
objects [Naturobjekten]. What we take as things are pictures, statues, gardens, houses, 
tables, clothes, tools, etc. They are value-objects [Wertobjekte] of various kinds, use-
objects [Gebrauchsobjekte], practical objects. They are not objects which can be found in 
natural science. [Es sind keine naturwissenschaftlichen Objekte] (Husserl, 1989, p. 29) 
Husserl in fact thinks the concept of an objective ‘world in itself’ that is considered 
independent of all subjectivity is a peculiar theoretical construction – useful in the sciences 
but one-sided in terms of metaphysics:
The contrast between the subjectivity of the life-world and the “objective,” the “true” 
world, lies in the fact that the latter is a theoretical-logical substruction [Substruktion], 
the substruction of something that is in principle not perceivable, in principle not 
experienceable in its own proper being, whereas the subjective, in the life-world [das 
lebensweltlich Subjektive], is distinguished in all respects precisely by its being actually 
experienceable. (Husserl, 1970, p. 127)
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Phenomenology as a descriptive practice opposes any form of analysis that reduces the unified 
nexus of conscious flowing life to a collection of isolated and atomistic mental experiences. 
Lived experiences are the starting point – but these cannot be narrowly thought of as, for 
example, stimuli (Quine’s ‘noises and scratches’) or as sense data. Experience is a multi-modal 
sensory intertwining and interweaving, not just of the different senses (touch, sight, hearing 
smell, taste) and our bodily proprioception, but also as experience filtered by mood and 
inflected by emotion and various cognitive attitudes. Phenomenology has always recognized 
that perception is a multimodal, embodied achievement, an intertwining of various sense 
modalities (sight, touch) and of bodily proprioceptive movements (called ‘kinaestheses’ in the 
psychological terminology of the time), such as eye movements, hand movements, movements 
of the body (to get nearer, get a better grip, look more closely), involving looking over the 
object, pointing, grasping, moving around the object, and so on. The body is in the world as the 
“heart is in the organism”, Merleau-Ponty declares (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 209). Embodied 
perception brings the visible, tangible, spatial and material world alive. There is a very fine 
attunement between lived body and world. Moreover, disorders of the embodied relation to 
the world involve a significant modification of the way the world appears, as in pathological 
cases such as the case of the brain damaged former soldier Schneider, discussed by Merleau-
Ponty (2012, pp. 105-140). More recently, for example, Louis A. Sass and Elizabeth Pienkos 
(2013), who have studied delusion from the phenomenological perspective, have identified 
necessary structural features of delusions, e.g., mutations of time, space, causality, self-
experience, or sense of reality, that challenge accounts of delusion as a belief mode or doxastic 
state. They discuss the delusional mood which involves feelings of strangeness and tension, 
and a sense of tantalizing yet ineffable meaning. This simply illustrates how phenomenology 
is being used in descriptions of embodied experience in a wide range of settings. 
Phenomenology, moreover, recognises that persons are in part constituted through their feelings, 
emotions and moods. Moods ‘colour’ emotions (Husserl, Stein) can intensify, weaken, extent, 
curtail emotions. One’s world is filtered through emotions and moods (Scheler, Heidegger). 
Emotions are not just felt by and expressed in the body (e.g. facial expressions, smiling) but the 
whole body is inhabited emotionally: e.g. the whole body can be tense; a way of walking can be 
nervous, one’s social world can be experienced as anxiety-filled, and so on. 
Phenomenology is also very useful for explorings the notions of foreground, background 
and horizon in experiences. The philosophical discussion of the intentional greatly benefits 
from being broadened to the discussion of overall being-in-the-world. There is always in 
any experience a combination of present and absent moments, to see the front side is at the 
same time to have an empty intending apprehension of the rear side of an object in the form 
of a determinable indeterminacy. Furthermore, as Heidegger emphasizes, what one sees is 
constrained by one’s background assumptions and by the overall context of the ‘environment’ 
(Umwelt) and life-world. A craftsperson can identify the appropriate tools for a particular 
task and immediately sees what needs to be done. The gardener identifies some plants as 
flowers and others as weeds, not based on botanical classification but based on their usefulness 
and appropriateness in the context of gardening (itself a cultural and historically inflected 
practice). This is what Heidegger means when he says we first encounter objects in a practical 
way as ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden) rather than merely as ‘present-at-hand’ (vorhanden), objects 
merely theoretically apprehended, shorn of their context of usefulness (Heidegger, 1962; 
Dreyfus, 1991). For Heidegger, humans are already embedded (‘immer schon da’) in a pre-
formed, and largely intuitively-apprehended, historical and cultural world. Moreover, they are 
oriented primarily to the future, and the past is always implicitly interpreted in terms of this 
future project. Human beings live in an Umwelt with which one interacts, very much like one 
“lays down a path in walking” as Francisco Varela put it. Or like the manner in which a spider 
13. Some Enduring 
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generates its web from the silk thread produced within its own body from the spinnerets in its 
abdomen. Against Kant, who denied the experience of the totality of the world as such, Husserl 
defends the consciousness of world as a genuine phenomenon:
I am continually conscious of individual things in the world, as things that interest me, 
move me, disturb me, etc., but in doing this I always have consciousness of the world 
itself, as that in which I myself am, although it is not there as is a thing, does not affect 
me as things do, is not, in a sense similar to things, an object of my dealings. If I were 
not conscious of the world as world, without its being capable of becoming objective 
in the manner of an [individual] object, how could I survey the world reflectively 
and put knowledge of the world into play, thus lifting myself above the simple, 
straightforwardly directed life that always has to do with things? (Husserl, 1970, p. 251)
One of the challenges of phenomenology is how to express its descriptive findings. The 
ability to make fine discriminations must be matched with an equal ability to translate these 
discriminations into appropriately fine-grained linguistic communication (for a critique of 
phenomenology as lacking analytic rigor, see Searle, 2005). Husserl himself recognized this 
problem but did not address it centrally at least until some of his later writings, for instance 
his essay “On the Origin of Geometry” (Husserl, 1970), where he accorded to written language 
an enormously important role in fixing the meanings of ideal objectivities such as occur in 
mathematics so that they can be accessed as the same over and over again. For Heidegger, 
however, the issue of language became inescapable and marked a major turning in his 
conception of phenomenology and its possibilities. Subsequent phenomenology (Jacques 
Derrida, for instance, in so far as his work is motivated by phenomenology and continues 
to work within the phenomenological epoché, as he himself has attested) has had to grapple 
with the complexity of the relationship between language and experience in ways that have 
frequently challenged many of Husserl’s assumptions.
Phenomenology is an enduring resource for philosophers interested in the first-person 
perspective, the subjective experience of embodied living, perceiving, and knowing, the 
affective life with its disclosive moods, the existential experience of temporality and the 
complex co-intentionalities involved in sociality, empathy and intersubjective communal life.
Phenomenology still has much to contribute in the understanding of life-world, the experience 
of the other, and the complex phenomena of interculturality.
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